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The Road from Westray:
A Predictable Path to Disaster?
MORE THAN A YEAR HAS PASSED since publication of The Westray Story
(Report of the Westray Mine Public Inquiry, Justice K. Peter Richard, Commissioner,
1997). This report made scathing findings of fact about the hazardous operation of the
mine during its short life and the failure of the government to regulate this dangerous
activity properly. These findings were received favourably by a community already
aware of the grim truth of Westray from prior investigative reports, books and the
wide media coverage given to the inquiry’s 76 days of hearings, at which 71 witnesses
gave often gripping testimony about the events leading up to, and following, the
disaster.1
The passage of time has provided an opportunity to reflect more dispassionately on
that report, assessing both its strengths and weaknesses, and to consider more broadly
its impact on the ideology and practice of occupational health and safety regulation in
Nova Scotia. We need to consider the report’s general influence, rather than just its
effect on mine safety, because, under current economic conditions, it is doubtful that
new underground coal mines will be opened in Nova Scotia in the foreseeable future
and existing underground coal mining in Cape Breton (in any event, regulated by the
federal government) is being wound down. Given this context, little would be
accomplished by reforms limited to provincial underground coal-mine regulation,
although the overwhelming majority of the Inquiry’s recommendations are directed to
just this specific end.
For this reason, as important as the Inquiry’s findings of fact are, it is vital that we
critically consider the theoretical framework that implicitly informed Justice K. Peter
Richard’s report and how that shaped his analysis of Westray and, more importantly,
his recommendations for the reform of occupational health and safety regulation. The
danger is that the genuine outrage expressed by the report, and felt by the community,
will be misdirected into a series of reforms that may allow the conditions that
produced Westray to be tragically and disastrously reproduced elsewhere.
Rarely has an inquiry into a disaster so vehemently condemned the practices of
1 The broad outline of the pattern of corporate recklessness and government inaction was revealed in
press reports released within weeks of the disaster. At the risk of appearing immodest, my colleague
Harry Glasbeek and I were able to piece much of this together in a working paper released six months
after the disaster. Harry Glasbeek and Eric Tucker, “Death by Consensus: The Westray Story” (York
University, Centre for Research on Work and Society, Working Paper Series, No. 3, November 1992),
reprinted in David Frank and Gregory Kealey, eds., Labour and Working-Class History in Atlantic
Canada: A Reader (St. John’s, 1996). Also see Shaun Comish, The Westray Tragedy (Halifax, 1993)
and Dean Jobb, Calculated Risk (Halifax, 1994).
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both the private owners and the government regulators. Richard found that the
management of Curragh Resources, owners of the Westray mine,
...created a workplace that fostered a disregard for worker safety. Westray
management either dismissed fundamental safety hazards for those working
under ground in the mine — including roof, dust, and gas conditions — or
addressed them inadequately....Westray is a stark example of an operation
where production demands violated basic and fundamental demands of safe
mining practice....[M]anagement’s drive for production, together with its
disdain for safety, played a key role in the devastation of the Westray mine.
(p. 135)
This finding is amply supported by a detailed review of the mine’s development and
operation. Although a number of feasibility studies were conducted by a number of
would-be investors, a mine plan was never fully developed. Instead, Westray
developers focused on monetary concerns, particularly obtaining generous federal and
provincial government financing of the project to minimize their risk. Their fiscal risk
aversion stood in stark contrast to the near complete disregard for the potential risks
that the project posed for the lives and health of the underground miners.
This uncaring attitude manifested itself once the mining operation began. The
report documents a long list of failures on the part of Westray management. Mine
supervisors and miners were underqualified and inadequately trained, ventilation was
poorly planned and badly executed, methane was allowed to accumulate at unsafe
levels, coal dust was not treated to reduce its explosive potential, and the work
organization did not provide miners with an effective means to communicate their
health and safety concerns and have them addressed. Indeed, miners were made to
understand that if they were not satisfied with their working conditions their only
option was to quit (p. 185).
The report was unable to determine conclusively the immediate cause of the
explosion in the early morning hours of 9 May 1992, a fact that provided provincial
prosecutors an excuse to stay the criminal charges against the mine manager, Gerald
Phillips, and the underground supervisor, Roger Parry. But this reason for
prosecutorial discretion is not sustained by the report’s findings. The evidence
marshalled in the report supports its theory that a spark from the continuous miner
ignited methane accumulated in the mine and that this in turn triggered a coal dust
explosion. Although the report found evidence that the methanometer on the
continuous monitor was tampered with (to prevent it from automatically shutting
down the miner if methane levels became dangerous), it rejected the conclusion that
this tampering in any way caused the explosion (p. 227). Rather, the report concluded
that the explosion occurred because mine management allowed dangerous levels of
methane and untreated coal dust to accumulate, in violation of existing provincial
safety laws. Had there been compliance with the law, there would not have been such
a calamitous disaster. There was, then, sufficient evidence in the report to make a case
that the reckless and often illegal operation of the mine led to the disaster and that this
operation was, in part, under the control of the two accused.
The report also considered why Westray was able to operate a dangerous mine in
violation of provincial law. Richard catalogued and harshly condemned the failure of
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government regulators involved with the Westray project to exercise their legal
powers to protect the miners. Again, Richard begins at the top. Former Premier
Donald Cameron, the member for the riding in which the Westray mine was located,
is justly vilified by Richard for his refusal to accept any responsibility for the Westray
disaster. Richard characterizes his testimony, and that of others who blamed the
miners for the explosion, as “self-serving, cynical and simplistic” (p. 222). Richard
cites Cameron’s statement that “We enjoy the comfort of opinion without discomfort
of thought” and then comments acidly: “The record will show that this quotation is as
descriptive of the evidence and opinions voiced by Cameron as it is of the testimony
given by many other witnesses at the Inquiry” (pp. 512-13). Although Richard did not
find direct political interference with safety enforcement, he concluded that
Cameron’s “aggressive pursuit of the Westray project may have sent a message to the
bureaucracy, especially the inspectorate, that Westray was ‘special’ and ought to be
treated as such” (p. 514). Finally, he found that Cameron, in acting against the advice
of his officials, lacked a clear understanding of the acceptable level of political
support that a minister or cabinet could provide for a project or of the relation between
a minister and his department in dealing with such projects (pp. 521-2).
The two government departments most involved with Westray were Natural
Resources and Labour. Although earlier accounts of the Westray disaster noted that
the government officials and agencies that reviewed Westray plans failed to seriously
consider whether coal could be mined safely, those accounts failed to note that the
provincial Mineral Resources Act required the Minister of Natural Resources to be
satisfied that a mining project would be safe before issuing a permit. In addition, any
alteration to the mine plan required advance approval from the minister, which was to
be given only if safety to life and property was preserved. The Inquiry carefully
reviewed the role of Natural Resources and found that it either misunderstood or
overlooked its overriding responsibility to ensure that Westray’s mine plans were
inherently safe (p. 401). Moreover, after the mine began operation, the department
probably knew of unapproved changes to the mine plan but failed to ensure
compliance with the legislation (p. 448).
The failure of the Department of Labour to enforce the Coal Mine Protection Act
and the Occupational Health and Safety Act was widely commented on before the
Inquiry’s hearings, and the evidence gathered by the commission confirmed what we
already knew:
The Department of Labour, in general, and the inspectorate in particular,
was markedly derelict in meeting its statutory responsibilities at the Westray
mine. (p. 629, emphasis in the original)
The report found that the inspectors lacked the training and experience to perform
their role effectively and that they failed to receive adequate supervision and
guidance. Inspections were always announced in advance and inspectors were
accompanied and guided by management, preventing them from having open
communication with miners and from seeing or appreciating the true state of
underground operations. Finally, the orders the Department of Labour issued, most
notably those requiring stone dusting that would have prevented an explosion, were
not enforced.
Acadiensis134
Review Essays/Notes critiques 135
These findings of fact provide a partial answer to the question of why the Westray
mine exploded: mine management operated unsafely and government officials were
lax in exercising their regulatory powers. But this still leaves open the questions of
why mine management operated so dangerously and why government officials did not
intervene to stop such unlawful behaviour. The answers to these questions are more
difficult to derive directly from documentary and oral evidence. Rather, they depend,
in part, on a theoretical understanding of the determinants of occupational health and
safety conditions and of state action. On the one hand, we can view the “facts” of
Westray as aberrational while, on the other, we can see them as exemplary of systemic
problems. In reality, there is a continuum between these two positions, as well as a
variety of ways or levels at which systemic problems are defined. The problem with
the report is that, to the extent it does not viewWestray as aberrational, it inadequately
theorizes its systemic causes. This leads to recommendations that, even if followed,
may not produce major improvements in health and safety performance.
The central theoretical problem is to develop a framework that explains the
production of occupational injury, disease and death.2 Richard implicitly dismisses
frameworks generated from within the fields of psychology and micro-economics that
tend to place the individual worker at the centre of their analysis, focusing
respectively on personality and rational choice. Indeed, he condemns those who
would blame the miners for causing Westray due to their carelessness. He never
considers worth discussing a hypothetical argument that the miners rationally and
voluntarily chose to assume the risks in the Westray mine in exchange for wages.
While it is clear that Richard’s theoretical framework focused on the employer and
the government, not the worker, his understanding of what shapes their behaviour is
less obvious. Crucial to any analysis of the production of risk in capitalist economies
is the relation between safety and profit. In a competitive market economy, firms are
under continuous pressure to maintain profitability. There is a systemic demand to put
profits first. Of course, in some instances improved safety will be consistent with
profit maximization, but in others it will not.
Where safety pays, the task of regulators is less difficult. They need to convince
employers that it is in their own self-interest to adhere to certain standards. Poor
performance, then, can be rectified through education and improved organizational
awareness, commitment and competence. Workers can play an advisory role in that
process, contributing their experience and knowledge of the production process.
Where safety does not pay, some kind of countervailing pressure is required to
ensure that occupational health and safety conditions do not fall below socially
acceptable levels. Inspection and enforcement of state standards is one response;
empowering workers is another. The major problem with Richard’s analysis is that he
never comes to grips with this crucial problem. Instead, he tries to make it disappear.
The following passage from the frontispiece of the report is telling:
Once a mine is open, there begins the process of trade-off between
production and safety. From the chief executive officer to the miner at the
working face, the objective must be to operate the mine in a manner that
2 For an excellent discussion, see Theo Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury (London, 1997).
ensures the personal safety of the worker over the economic imperatives of
increased production. The two seemingly competing concepts — safety and
production — must be so harmonized that they can co-exist without doing
harm to each other. (p. viii)
Richard seems to want it every way. He begins by acknowledging conflict between
production and safety, proceeds to insist that safety must come first, and then
concludes by insisting that safety and production must be made compatible so that the
conflict evaporates (thereby precluding, presumably, the need to put safety before
production).
In the body of the report, this ambiguity tends to be resolved on the basis of the last
formulation — except that it often goes one step further. Instead of addressing the
problem of how to harmonize safety and production, it implicitly assumed that they
already are in harmony. This has significant ramifications for the report’s analysis of
the problem and the prescriptions that it offers.
For example, the Westray story is characterized as one “of incompetence, of
mismanagement, of bureaucratic bungling, of deceit, of ruthlessness, of cover-up, of
apathy, of expediency, and of cynical indifference”. Harsh words, indeed, but the
source of all this deviance, at least as far as mine management is concerned, is that
“through either incompetence or ignorance, [it] lost sight of the basic tenet of coal
mining: that safe mining is good business” (p. ix). If this is true, one has to assume —
given the history of death, injury and disease in the coal mining industry in Pictou
County and elsewhere — that coal mine operators, for some unknown reason, have
been unusually incompetent and ignorant in the management of their affairs.
The report’s analysis of the failings of the mine inspectors also tends towards a
deviance perspective, as opposed to seeing a more systemic problem with the widely
adopted internal responsibility model of regulation. Aside from the failings of
individual inspectors, Richard placed much of the blame for the inspectors’ inaction
on the shoulders of Jack Noonan, the executive director of the Occupational Health
and Safety (OHS) Division of the Department of Labour. In particular, it was his
version of the internal responsibility system (IRS) that “was a major deterrent to
effective enforcement of the safety regulations relating to underground coal mining”
(p. 455).
According to Richard, Noonan’s version was deficient because it emphasized the
inspectors’ role in persuading, educating, facilitating and assisting the workplace
parties to develop the capacity to assume primary responsibility for health and safety
(p. 471). This, the report says, is inconsistent with the approach to the IRS in other
provinces, particularly Ontario which served as a model for Richard’s analysis. In
fact, the Noonan philosophy, of which Richard is so critical, is not radically different
from the version of the IRS that is officially espoused in most other jurisdictions,
including Ontario. For example, Preventing Injury and Illness, a policy paper issued
by the Ontario Ministry of Labour in January 1998, states (p. 8) that: “The overall
objective of the OHS system is to improve OHS performance...by providing
motivation and support to individual workplaces in order that they may build a strong
IRS and achieve self-reliance”.
Perhaps the crux of the difference is less a matter of the goal, but of the means used
to achieve it. Tensions have always abounded within the IRS model in this regard, but
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two in particular are relevant to this discussion. The first is over the role of the
external responsibility system in its relation to the IRS. Governments and employers
have typically favoured a “gentle persuasion” approach, in which the inspectors
encourage and educate the workplace parties to work cooperatively through the
institutions of the IRS to meet, indeed surpass, regulatory requirements. This
approach is justified on the basis that rational employers want to comply with the law
because, after all, safety is good business. Inspectors do not act as safety police with
a mandate to detect and investigate unlawful behaviour, and government uses formal
enforcement measures sparingly, only when other, less coercive, measures have
failed. Prosecution is a last resort, only to be attempted after a worker has been
seriously injured or killed as the result of a violation. Despite Richard’s protestations
to the contrary, the actions of the Westray inspectors were not inconsistent with the
mainstream IRS vision.
Workers, trade unions and, sometimes, the inspectors themselves have argued for
a more vigorous approach to enforcement, based on the view that there are a
significant number of employers who resist complying with the law because they do
not believe, at least in some cases, it is in their financial self-interest to do so. For
example, in Ontario, the model jurisdiction according to Richard, the inspectors,
through their union, formally complained in 1986 that senior officials in the Ministry
of Labour were thwarting enforcement. An inquiry exonerated the ministry on the
basis that its conduct had to be evaluated “on the basis that the IRS prevails”.3
Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the level of enforcement has persisted.
Richard does recognize the uneasy place of enforcement within the IRS model.
Indeed, at one point, he identifies the lack of emphasis on regulation “at least in the
early stages of the IRS” (p. 472) as a weakness of the system. Moreover, he condemns
the provincial inspectors for using the IRS to divert attention from its responsibilities
(p. 477) which, presumably, include using the Department of Labour’s powers to
ensure that unsafe conditions are not allowed to persist. The problem, however, is that
Richard’s acceptance of the IRS model, and the premises that support it, lead him to
underestimate the difficulty for inspectors of adopting an “uncompromising position
on strict compliance” (p. 605). It is telling that Richard makes no specific
recommendation to increase the level of enforcement of occupational health and
safety law.
The report, however, does call for more officers’ and directors’ accountability,
under provincial health and safety and, possibly, federal criminal law, for the failure
to maintain safe workplaces (p. 601). This is a welcome recommendation, even if it
appears almost as an afterthought, tacked to the end of the Report as a response to the
brief submitted by the United Steelworkers of America. But it is not clear that the
main impediment to prosecution is the inadequacy of existing legislation. Often, the
chief stumbling block is the unwillingness of law enforcement officials to deploy
these instruments against corporate directors, officers and managers engaged in the
pursuit of profit. Government officials tend to see wrong-doing in this context as a
3 G. G. McKenzie and J. I. Laskin, Report on the Administration of the Occupational Health and Safety
Act (Ontario, 1987), vol. I, p. xx.
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civil problem for which damages are the appropriate remedy, even when physical
harm has been inflicted on the victims. For example, the manufacturers of the Dalkon
shield and the producers of asbestos products have never been charged with any
offence, despite their reckless endangerment of the users of their products.
The prosecution of Westray, Phillips and Parry represented a break from this
pattern, but the decision of the provincial prosecution service in June 1998 to stay the
criminal charges constituted a return to the well-established pattern. The justification
that they offered for this measure is hard to square with the mass of evidence compiled
by Richard showing that it was the accumulation of gas and coal dust that was
responsible for the explosion, even though the source of ignition could not be
precisely ascertained. Moreover, this rationale leaves unexplained why charges were
laid in the first place and why the government fought all the way to the Supreme Court
of Canada for the right to reinstate the charges after the trial judge stayed the
proceedings because of a lack of proper disclosure by the Crown.
A second point of conflict within the IRS model concerns the role of worker
participation. Typically, workers are given a right to know, a right to participate and
an individual right to refuse unsafe work. Their role is defined as “contributory”, and
they are not given decision-making authority. In addition, because governments view
occupational health and safety as an area of common employer-employee interest,
they have not seen the need to address the question of imbalances in power between
workers and employers. Indeed, according to the IRS model, adversarial relations are
destructive to the proper functioning of the system and should be strongly
discouraged.4 This view has been challenged by many health and safety activists who
have argued that a weakness of the IRS is that workers lack the necessary power to
ensure that employers comply with their legal responsibilities and to protect
themselves when faced with unsafe conditions. Adversarial strategies, they argue, are
sometimes necessary in a system in which profit and safety may conflict. Since the
IRS model was first implemented, workers have fought to expand their power within
the system, but have met with limited success, largely due to the vociferous opposition
of employers who have resisted conceding control over production.
Richard’s discussion of these issues is particularly disappointing, especially given
the history of the Westray mine and the inability the non-unionized miners to exert
any influence in the IRS. But, because Westray is constructed as deviant, Richard
does not see unequal power relations in the workplace as a systemic problem that
needs redress. Instead, he adopts the view that adversarial behaviour is pathological
and is caused by trade unions using health and safety issues to achieve other ends. In
support of this conclusion, Richard cites as unacceptable the confrontational attitude
of union officials he observed at Devco’s Phalen mine in Cape Breton (p. 568). To
isolate occupational health and safety from industrial relations, Richard recommends
that the legislation be amended to prohibit a person who is, or has been in the last year,
a member of the executive of an employee organization from being a member of the
4 Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines (James M. Ham,
Commissioner, Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, 1976); Joint Federal Provincial Inquiry
Commission into Safety in Mines and Mining Plants in Ontario, Towards Safe Production (Kevin
Burkett, Commissioner, 1981).
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joint health and safety committee (p. 510).
The problem with Richard’s conclusion is that the evidence does not support his
contention that adversarial approaches are undesirable. For example, a study of joint
health and safety committees in Ontario and Quebec found that “adversarial relations
between management and labour formed part of a factor which was associated with
lower injury rates in unionized work places”.5 What this suggests is that, contrary to
official wisdom, cooperation in achieving good occupational health and safety
outcomes cannot be assumed as the normal condition, deriving from a natural
commonality of interests among workers and employers. Power and influence matter,
and a confrontational attitude might be justified when faced with employer resistance.
Richard recognizes this, if only partially and implicitly, by suggesting that the disaster
might have been avoided had the Westray miners gained certification of the United
Mine Workers of America as a result of the vote held in January 1992 (p. 607).
However, he fails to develop this insight in his report and makes no recommendations
to strengthen worker rights in the IRS.
The Westray Storymaps out a path to disaster but, like all exercises in cartography,
provides only a partial representation of reality. The route that Richard describes is
filled with people who exhibit a lack of concern for the safety of workers: mine
developers anxious to secure government funding; politicians keen to attract
investment in their ridings, but unwilling to be accountable for the consequences;
government regulators lacking the training and motivation to effectively exercise their
statutory power to protect the public; and mine operators keen to produce coal
immediately, whatever the risk. Richard criticizes them all in appropriately harsh
terms. For this he is to be commended. Past commissions of inquiry have been much
less forthcoming in this regard.
But the map of what went wrong is constructed from a flawed survey of the terrain.
Richard uncritically accepts conventional occupational health and safety wisdom. In
his view, the path to disaster was caused by a deviation from the IRS model; it was
not the consequence of its normal operation. As a result, despite his outrage, Richard
found nothing fundamentally wrong with the system. We just have to get back on
track. This way of thinking about Westray has resulted in a series of recommendations
which the Nova Scotia government has accepted wholeheartedly and promised to
implement.6
Undoubtedly, some improvements will result from the recommendations of Justice
Richard’s report, even though it has failed to interrogate crucial assumptions. To the
extent those assumptions are flawed, a different map of the road to disaster needs to
be drawn. A more accurate map of the road to Westray would indicate that the disaster
is not found down a sideroad, but that it was a predictable destination on the main
highway. The report would have us continue down this road, but at what cost and at
whose expense?
ERIC TUCKER
5 Carolyn Tuohy and Marcel Simard, “The Impact of Joint Health and Safety Committees in Ontario
and Quebec” (a study prepared for the Canadian Association of Administrators of Labour Law,
January 1993).
6 Westray A Plan of Action (Government of Nova Scotia, December, 1997).
